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3.1  Introduction 
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, manufacturing firms in most in- 
dustrialized nations have sought greater organizational flexibility in response 
to intensified international competition based on product quality and process 
innovation. This is especially true in the automobile industry where firms are 
experimenting with  new  forms of  work  organization, new  human resource 
strategies, new uses of technology, and new work-force participation schemes 
(Womack, Jones, and Roos  1990; Dertouzos et al.  1989; Hirst and Zeitlin 
1989; Piore and Sabel 1984; Tolliday and Zeitlin 1987; Kochan, Katz, and 
McKersie 1986; Kern and Schumann 1985; Hyman and Streeck 1988; Dull 
1985). Much of  the research on work restructuring examines the effects of 
industrial relations practices, the use of  technology, and management  and 
union strategies on the structure of employment systems (Hyman and Streeck 
1988; Kochan et al. 1986; Katz 1985; Katz and Sabel 1985). Adjustments be- 
ing made to training practices and the effects of these practices on organiza- 
tional flexibility have not been adequately isolated and analyzed in the discus- 
sion of  workplace restructuring. It  is often  maintained  that  increasing the 
internal flexibility’ of the firm results in increasing skill requirements for work- 
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References within the text to the German automobile industry refer to automobile production 
in the former West Germany only. 
1. For the purposes of this paper, I concentrate on what Atkinson (1987) has referred to as 
“functional flexibility.”  Functional flexibility focuses on how labor is deployed within the work 
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ers and the need for more worker training. There has been little empirical data 
gathered,  however, to assess how  the types  of  training  offered  to different 
groups of workers have actually changed, which groups of workers get access 
to training under flexible work structures, and how these training practices dif- 
fer across countries. Furthermore, there has been little examination of the role 
existing educational  and training  institutions play  in facilitating changes in 
training strategies. 
Most studies on firm-provided  training  focus on the relationship between 
wages and training, after controlling for other employee demographic  vari- 
ables, as well as on broad descriptions of training practices within firms. Re- 
cent studies include those by Mincer (1983, 1988), Brown (1989), Lillard and 
Tan  (1986),  Pergamit  and  Shack-Marquez  (1986),  Barron,  Black,  and 
Loewenstein (1987), and Lynch (1988, 1992). These studies find a high indi- 
vidual rate of return to training but show that most firm-provided training in 
the United States is concentrated among managerial, professional, and techni- 
cal employees. 
Other quantitative studies using company-based surveys on training provide 
more information about training at the firm level than the studies cited above 
(see, e.g., Bartel 1989; Barron et al. 1987; Bishop 1988; Lusterman 1977). The 
major findings of these studies include that larger high-tech firms provide more 
training than smaller firms. These studies, however, are neither able to capture 
the dynamic adjustment process training is undergoing nor able to provide de- 
tailed comparisons with other industrialized countries. 
More detailed analysis linking training to changing work structures and la- 
bor market  institutions at the plant  level is needed  to explain how training 
affects work restructuring within industries in different countries. A number 
of “institutional” studies have analyzed how training institutions and practices 
in different countries influence the structure of jobs and the employment sys- 
tem as a whole (Steedman and Wagner, 1989; Steedman, Mason, and Wagner 
1991; Osterman  1988; Maurice,  Sellier,  and  Silvestre  1986; Mehaut  1988; 
Daly, Hitchens, and Wagner 1985; Hartmann et al. 1983; Maurice et al. 1980). 
Although these studies demonstrate the important role training plays in  the 
restructuring of  work, more empirical work is needed in order to understand 
how training practices affect the ability of firms to restructure their employ- 
ment systems and in order to provide insight into other institutional factors that 
influence this restructuring. 
Using new  microlevel  data on training-gathered  through  detailed inter- 
views with managers in production, training, and human resource departments, 
as well as with labor representatives, at nine unionized automobile plants in the 
United  States and nine automobile plants in Germany-I  show how various 
process, the skills of  workers, and the extent to which the organization of  work facilitates adjust- 
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institutional  factors combine to influence plant-level training  practices  and 
their effects on efforts to achieve the organizational flexibility necessary to 
produce diversified products of high quality. The analysis divides the training 
offered at the plant level in the two countries into different categories-prod- 
uct and process training, teamwork-plus training, and technical training. I ex- 
amine the number of hours of training and the quality of training that are of- 
fered within these categories to different  groups of  workers across the two 
countries. I then analyze the effect training practices have on fostering employ- 
ment system flexibility within individual plants. 
3.2  The Institutional Background 
The rise of  more flexible employment systems in the 1980s has increased 
the demand for workers with broader skills. However, the ease with which 
firms find workers with these broader skills or are able to retrain their incum- 
bent workers depends on the structures and institutions that surround work 
processes and influence individual and group behavior. These institutions are 
not the same in every nation; in some countries firm training practices may 
foster employment system flexibility, while in other countries training practices 
may frustrate such flexibility. Therefore, to understand how training practices 
relate to and influence employment systems, one must first understand the in- 
stitutional environment in which firms in different countries operate. 
3.2.1 
United States 
The majority of occupational training in the United States takes place at the 
secondary level, in high schools, or at the postsecondary level, in junior col- 
leges, community colleges, and technical schools. Occupational, or vocational, 
training in the United  States does not actually constitute a national  system. 
Variation among states in governance, administration, and control of these in- 
stitutions leads to training differences across similar occupations and to diffi- 
culties in distinguishing one type of school from another. Curriculum and stan- 
dards vary across states and localities, are often heavily influenced by  local 
industries, and concentrate on specific rather than general skills (Grubb 1984; 
Jacobs 1989; Hamilton 1990). 
The dominance  of  school-based  occupational  training  gives  enterprise- 
based, i.e., apprenticeship, training only a small role in postsecondary occupa- 
tional education. Although it involves a small portion of those receiving occu- 
pational training, apprenticeship training is an important means for industrial 
firms to secure a skilled work force. In the auto industry, apprenticeship train- 
ing is primarily established for adults already employed. It is the means by 
which nonskilled workers get access to higher wages and skilled work off the 
assembly line. The federal government has regulated apprenticeship training 
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since the 1930s; however, the federal role is limited to recommending mini- 
mum standards for apprenticeships in certain occupations. The actual stan- 
dards of  apprenticeship training are established through the collective bar- 
gaining process between unions and management. 
In  the unionized sector of  the  auto industry, the United Auto Workers 
(UAW), along with management of the various companies, sets the apprentice- 
ship standards for the skilled trades. The UAW  supports 33 apprenticeable 
classifications in the basic trades. The Skilled Trades Department of the UAW 
works with the National Joint CompanyAJnion Skilled Trades and Apprentice- 
ship committees to establish a general outline of topics to be taught in a partic- 
ular apprenticeship.  Various “work processes” are learned on the job during the 
apprentice’s daily eight-hour shift. The apprentice learns these work processes 
under the supervision of a skilled tradesperson. This training is very broadly 
defined and relies on the individual skilled tradesperson to teach the apprentice 
the various processes during the working day. The topics under “related in- 
struction”-including  math, science, shop, and drawing-are  taught at a local 
community college in the evening, two  to three nights a week in two-hour 
sessions. In total, 93 percent of apprenticeship training time occurs on the job 
and seven percent in the classroom. 
The content and form of an apprenticeship is determined by local joint ap- 
prenticeship committees composed of an equal number of members represent- 
ing the company and members representing the union. The committee con- 
tracts with a local college to perform the related instruction. The actual training 
one receives as an apprentice is very much dependent upon the job structure 
and organization of work at one’s particular plant. Thus, workers receive firm- 
specific or even plant-specific training rather than broad occupational skills 
training. The industrial apprenticeship system does a poor job of  providing 
these broad  occupational skills for several reasons: there is not  consensus 
among national educators or the representatives of management and labor on 
what skills and standards are important for a particular occupation; not all the 
costs of  general occupational skills training can be shifted to workers, and 
management is often reluctant to take on the risks associated with such train- 
ing; and labor unions have traditionally focused on job control as a way  to 
achieve higher wages and employment  security, rather than  on training  in 
broad, transferable skills. 
In U.S. plants, occupational training has only a minor effect on the composi- 
tion of  further training (formal training within the firm). The vast majority 
of  training for production and maintenance jobs has been firm specific and 
traditionally occurred informally on the job or formally in apprenticeship pro- 
grams.  Several factors combined in  the U.S.  auto industry throughout the 
1980s, however, to bring about more formal training for the work force and to 
link training with the strategy of restructuring toward greater internal flexibil- 
ity. The use of  complex, computerized production equipment has increased 
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stamping. Greater knowledge of electronics and mechanics is needed to moni- 
tor and troubleshoot the equipment. In addition, the need to produce higher- 
quality products has increased the need for skills in communication and for 
greater understanding by  the work force of  the product and the production 
process. 
Prior to the 1982 recession, training for nonskilled workers in the United 
States was  conducted primarily on the job. Workers would  learn new jobs 
through trial and error. The skilled trades received some technical training, but 
because the extent of robotics and computerized machinery in production was 
minor, the amount of such training tended to be small. The automobile compa- 
nies saw no advantage in increasing the responsibility of their workers or in- 
volving them in decisions. However as the market worsened, the automobile 
companies, in conjunction with the UAW, began to experiment with new ways 
to increase productivity and product quality. Joint training programs were es- 
tablished to increase the general skills of the existing work force and to retrain 
those workers on permanent layoff. 
These training programs were negotiated nationally  during the  1983-84 
round of bargaining as part of  the joint national employee development and 
training program. This program is funded jointly by the local UAW  union and 
the company. The company contributes ten  cents per  worker-hour and  the 
union  five  cents per worker-hour into this fund. Under the agreement, the 
union’s  contribution goes into a local fund (the nickel fund) for plant-level 
training that is not specifically  job related. The contribution from the company 
goes to the central human resource, or training, center that each company has 
established in Detroit. These training centers and their satellite centers around 
the country were originally established to retrain and help find jobs for the 
150,000 auto workers who were laid off during the 1982-83  recession. After 
fulfilling their original mission of retraining laid-off workers and helping them 
find new jobs, the training centers shifted focus and began to hold seminars for 
union and management trainers to teach them how to conduct a needs analysis 
at their plant, select training programs from equipment vendors, and evaluate 
the success of their plant training programs. 
This joint training agreement led to a participatory role for local unions in 
the automobile industry. The local union in the United States traditionally has 
representatives on the local joint apprenticeship committee, which oversees the 
apprenticeship program at the plant; however, under this agreement on train- 
ing, the local union president and shop chairperson, along with the plant and 
personnel manager, serve on a training committee and approve all nickel fund 
allocations. Some automobile plants also have local union representatives in 
the training department who help create and implement training programs, 
while other plants only inform the local union of training activities. Although 
access to training is decided by seniority and by  the needs of the supervisor, 
local unions have been successful in ensuring that many workers have access 
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participatory role effectively. Many local unions simply acquiesce to manage- 
ment and concede on issues, either because they are overwhelmed by their new 
role as participant or because of a deep concern for losing jobs. 
Germany 
In contrast to the U.S. occupational training system, the primary method of 
occupational training in Germany is the enterprise-based apprenticeship sys- 
tem. Under this system, businesses fund both classroom education and appren- 
ticeships at their firms. In addition, the German education and training system 
has a federally regulated cumculum. Upon completing the training require- 
ments, a student (17-21  years old) is given a diploma that certifies that he or 
she has met the nationally established standards of his or her occupation. For 
a young student, an apprenticeship represents a career investment; the wage of 
a first-year apprentice is typically  only 22-33  percent of  the going skilled 
worker wage. This contrasts with the typically older first-year industrial ap- 
prentice in the United States who earns 65 percent of the skilled worker wage. 
The standards and cumculum for apprenticeships  in Germany are estab- 
lished by  a national tripartite board consisting of  representatives from labor 
unions and employer associations as well as from the economics ministry of 
the government. Making sure that this curriculum is implemented (for indus- 
trial enterprises) is the responsibility of local chambers of industry and com- 
merce. The vocational training committees of these chambers consist of equal 
representation of employer and employee representatives and vocational school 
teachers; these teachers, however, have only an advisory role on the commit- 
tees. These chambers have the authority to assess the suitability of  firms to 
provide training, monitor the training contracts of firms, advise firms on how 
to improve their apprenticeship training, arbitrate conflicts between  appren- 
tices and  firms, and administer final competency exams for apprentices  in 
their region. 
Apprenticeship  programs  in  Germany differ substantially  in content and 
standards from industrial apprenticeship programs in the United States. Young 
apprentices are expected to know the fundamental principles of their trade be- 
fore they are able to practice it. Simply being able to perform the task of a 
skilled worker at a particular plant is not enough. Federal standards require 
that apprentices learn the theory behind their trade and some of the theoretical 
principles of related trades. German apprentices are trained beyond the needs 
of any one particular job or task. 
German firms have responded to demands for more broadly trained workers 
by  redefining occupations within the existing training system. The demands 
for flexibility along with the need to update the content of the industrial ap- 
prenticeships, which had not been formally changed since the 1930s, led Ger- 
many’s tripartite board to officially alter its electrical and metalworking occu- 
pations in 1987. The 42 metalworking occupations were reduced to 6 broadly 
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In the past, metalworking apprenticeships consisted of one year of training 
in an occupational group and two years of training in a specialized area. The 
new apprenticeship structure calls for a year of basic occupational training for 
all metal trades, a year of training in each general occupational group, and 1.5 
years of  training in a specialized area. Under this structure both worker and 
management interests are satisfied. The first two years of training are broad, 
giving workers a firm foundation of knowledge that will be relevant throughout 
their working lives and giving them the ability, during the final 1.5 years of 
training, to specialize very rapidly in certain areas important to the firm. 
The reorganization of occupations has also led to a new metalworking occu- 
pation (industrial mechanic) with a specialty in production mechanics. This 
occupation is specifically designed for the production department. In particu- 
lar, it represents the strategy of the German auto industry to upgrade produc- 
tion work and get more skilled workers involved. The skilled workers in pro- 
duction mechanics are trained to be  system operators-those  workers who 
monitor transfer lines of production equipment, maintain the equipment, diag- 
nose problems, and make the necessary repairs on the spot. The importance of 
this trade is reflected in  its growth within the auto industry; the majority of 
first-year apprentices in the plants surveyed were either in the industrial me- 
chanic (production mechanics) or industrial electrician (production electron- 
ics) occupations. 
In  addition to new  occupations, the method of  training has changed from 
emphasizing lectures and narrow assignments to emphasizing group projects 
and independent thinking. Apprenticeship training is designed to teach young 
workers not only the technical aspects of their occupation but also how to work 
and communicate with other workers, how to work economically, and how to 
assess  quality. The  federal  curriculum  specifically states that  apprentices 
should plan their work, carry it out, and evaluate it independent of direct super- 
vision. The apprenticeship curriculum is also designed to encourage group 
work among the apprentices. This was advocated by the key industrial employ- 
ers association (Gesamtmetall) and the metalworkers union (IG Metall), who 
both felt that the ability to work in groups and interact with others was neces- 
sary for current production processes. 
Unlike in the United States, labor’s input into apprenticeship training in Ger- 
many occurs at several different levels (see Streeck et al. 1987). As discussed, 
IG Metall codetermines the structure and curriculum of apprenticeship training 
at the national level along with representatives of employers and government. 
At the regional level, labor representatives also serve on the vocational training 
committees within the chambers of industry and commerce. At the plant level, 
however, labor representatives in the works councils do not have the right of 
codetermination but rather the right to information concerning the number of 
apprentices hired and the quality of  the training being conducted. Although 
the works councils do not have a legal right to decide matters relating to ap- 
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training matters. By putting forth their own initiatives, many works councils 
are able to exert influence over apprenticeship training. This is most likely to 
be the case where works councils have traditionally been very powerful and 
are able to influence management decisions regarding apprenticeship training. 
In other companies, works councils function more as monitors of apprentice- 
ship programs, ensuring that workers are receiving appropriate training. 
The role of the works council with regard to further training in the firm is 
similar to its role with regard to apprenticeship training. Although works coun- 
cils have no legal right of codetermination in matters related to further training, 
they must be consulted on training matters, and most are able to give their 
input into who is selected to receive training. The influence of works councils 
in this area varies among companies; however, most works councils in the au- 
tomobile industry have become active in training issues, putting forth propos- 
als for increasing training across job groups. 
To  summarize, German enterprise-based training is part of  a highly struc- 
tured labor market consisting of well-defined occupations based on nationally 
standardized definitions. Employers have an economic incentive to train work- 
ers in broad occupational skills because they can pass on part of the cost to 
apprentices in the form of low wages, and they rely heavily on skilled workers 
in their production process (see Soskice, chap.  1  in this volume). The social 
partners in the training process (labor and government representatives) play a 
key role in ensuring that the training is of high quality and broad scope. The 
apprenticeship system is primarily designed for initial skill training of young 
people for careers as skilled blue-collar workers, giving them broad occupa- 
tional skills that will go beyond the needs of any one firm. The ability of the 
training system to provide a general skill base to workers at the workplace 
allows for more specific and sophisticated further training after the apprentice- 
ship. The establishment of new occupations and standards at the federal level 
through corporatist means has resulted in a unified response by management 
and labor toward work restructuring and training practices. 
In the United States, occupational training in colleges or technical schools 
is primarily geared toward technicians and concentrates on specific slulls. Only 
apprenticeship programs and high school vocational training can be considered 
systematic training for skilled blue-collar occupations. Apprenticeship training 
in the auto industry continues to reflect narrowly defined jobs within a tradi- 
tional form of work organization. In contrast to Germany, the United States 
lacks any institutional training structure that encourages firms to provide gen- 
eral skills at the workplace and to maintain high-quality training; furthermore, 
an incentive system is lacking for young people that rewards them for investing 
in general skills. As will be shown in section 3.3, efforts at reform are oc- 
curring plant by plant, resulting in discrepancies in the quality and content of 
apprenticeship training across plants. Firms which need broadly trained work- 
ers must take on the risks and provide the skills themselves. The unionized 
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training through a joint training fund. While this fund is a positive develop- 
ment, it alone is unlikely to provide the necessary skills to support a broadly 
trained flexible work force and a flexible employment system. 
3.2.2  The Organization of Work and Industrial Relations Effects 
Market pressures have generated different patterns of work organization and 
different uses of  labor across the two countries. In general, German plants 
show greater willingness to move away from traditional Taylorism and expand 
the use of  labor than do U.S. plants. Skilled maintenance workers in German 
plants have been integrated into production areas, and now perform both main- 
tenance and production tasks, in an effort to reduce downtime of production 
equipment and  increase productivity. Where  new  equipment has  been  in- 
stalled, traditional nonskilled jobs have  broadened in scope. An  example of 
this integration is the system operator positions in German plants, which are 
commonly found in areas with computerized production equipment; the job 
blends both production and maintenance tasks. Systems operators essentially 
monitor computerized transfer lines or work stations and are required to check 
the quality of the product or part with statistical process control (SPC), change 
machine tools when necessary, maintain the equipment, optimize the computer 
program for the equipment, assist with or perform major repairs, and commu- 
nicate with supervisors and other departments. In German plants, 75-100  per- 
cent of these jobs are held by skilled workers in a metal trade. The number of 
traditional nonskilled jobs held by  nonskilled workers is decreasing. Skilled 
jobs are being broadened to include production tasks, and ungraded  semi- 
skilled jobs are being filled by skilled workers. 
Such a system operator job was not found in the U.S. plants surveyed. The 
job classification system in the U.S. automobile industry continues to encour- 
age the division between skilled and nonskilled work.* Some plants have re- 
duced their number of classifications and broadened the lines of demarcations 
between jobs; however, a blending of traditional skilled maintenance tasks and 
nonslulled production work has not yet occurred. In response to the need for 
workers to monitor computerized production equipment, U.S. plants have up- 
graded the jobs of semiskilled workers, such as job setters, and have created 
some new positions to monitor the production process, alert maintenance when 
breakdowns occur, and provide leadership for other workers in automated pro- 
duction areas. 
The area of production and the use of technology also have a key influence 
on what is required of workers. In automobile assembly operations, there have 
been minor changes in the job content of assembly workers. Although the auto- 
mobile has become more complicated, with a greater variety of parts, the na- 
ture of assembly work is still very manual and tied to the pace of the transfer 
2. The terms “skilled” and “nonskilled’ refer to the classifications given to workers and are not 
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line.  In  the  body-welding  area,  high  automation  with  robotic  welders  has 
changed the skills required of nonskilled operators. Most of the operators in 
body welding monitor the transfer lines of robotic equipment. Monitoring du- 
ties require an understanding of this robotic equipment, the programs that run 
them, and the effect of  their operations on the welding process as a whole. 
Although these operators do not do maintenance work, they are asked to iden- 
tify and troubleshoot minor problems in the equipment. 
In transmission  and engine production,  similar differences between  areas 
are found. The jobs of workers in the assembly area have remained essentially 
the same. Although they are expected to check the quality of  the parts they 
put on the engine or transmission  and are responsible for the quality of their 
operations, their job tasks have changed little. Where assembly operations have 
been automated, changes in job content have occurred. Nonskilled operators 
no longer place the parts on the product manually, rather this is done automati- 
cally. The operator is now responsible for stacking parts on conveyors which 
feed the assembly robots. The operator must still check for quality, but the jobs 
have clearly been ~implified.~  Another result of  automation in this area has 
been the creation of  nonskilled positions to monitor various segments of the 
transfer-line equipment. This position requires not only knowledge of the ro- 
bots and their programs and the production process as a whole but also leader- 
ship responsibility for a group of operators on a portion of the line. 
The extent of input by labor representatives into matters of  work organiza- 
tion also differs between the two countries. Works councils in Germany with 
the help of the metalworkers union (IG Metall) have put forth initiatives for 
changing work organization. IG Metall supports works councils with training 
information and helps them draft proposals. Although works councils possess 
only the right to information and consultation in matters regarding work organ- 
ization, they nevertheless are able to make recommendations to management. 
In most plants, management works to achieve consensus with the works coun- 
cil  before  changes  are  made  because  of  the  possible  countermeasures  the 
works council could invoke if not consulted. 
In contrast, local unions in the United States are divided on how to respond 
to management initiatives for fundamental change in work rules and job de- 
marcations. Some local unions welcome change, while others resist what they 
view as an erosion of traditional union power. A history of adversarial relations 
and apprehension about participating in decisions with management has inhib- 
ited U.S. local unions from putting forth their own initiatives or from modi- 
fying management proposals. This partially explains why there is less job en- 
hancement overall in U.S. plants than in German plants. 
While work organization and job requirements in the industry are changing, 
the extent of these changes differ between the various work processes and the 
3. Milkman’s (1989) study of the Linden, New Jersey, plant provides a more detailed analysis of 
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countries  themselves.  Work  requirements  in  automobile  assembly  have 
changed very little, while jobs in the body-welding area have been enhanced. 
Assembly  and machining jobs in engine and transmission  production are a 
mixture of  low-skill  put-and-place  work and high-skill monitoring of  auto- 
mated transfer lines. German plants have primarily broadened the job content 
of skilled workers, including nonskilled workers as a result of  works council 
pressure. U.S. plants, on the other hand, have concentrated their reorganization 
efforts on upgrading nonskilled work because of the resistance of skilled work- 
ers to redefining the content of their jobs. Finally, labor representatives in Ger- 
many are more active in influencing the direction of organizational change than 
are U.S.  local unions. 
3.3  Specific Cases 
Given the institutional context developed above, I now  examine in more 
detail how specific plants are adjusting their employment systems and training 
practices to achieve greater flexibility and higher-quality production. 
3.3.1  Survey Sample 
The plants surveyed include not only automobile assembly but also engine 
and transmission plants.  By including engine and transmission  plants in the 
survey, a more accurate assessment can be obtained of the changes taking place 
in the organization of work and in the training practices in the industry as a 
whole.  Requests  for anonymity prevent  me  from identifying  the plants by 
name; however, I can say that the U.S. survey focused entirely on plants of the 
big three U.S. producers located in the Midwest and the German survey in- 
cluded all the major diversified automobile producers, as well as two luxury, 
specialty producers. Table 3.1 provides some description of  the automobile 
plants surveyed. In both Germany and the United States, the majority of plants 
are well-established, with production starting prior to 1965. A few plants were 
built in the 1970s, and one German assembly plant was built in 1986. While 
there was a mixture of new and old plants, only plant G-F can be considered a 
"greenfield"  plant. Therefore, I will concentrate on older plants that are at- 
tempting to restructure their production to meet the demands of a more com- 
petitive market, rather than on new facilities that are starting outright with new 
production concepts. 
It is also evident from table 3.1 that the German plants have significantly 
more employees. While U.S.  companies throughout  the  1980s and into the 
1990s have been reducing their work forces and decreasing their extent of ver- 
tical integration, German companies have continued to have market success 
and to hire employees. From  1970 to 1988, employment within the German 
automobile industry grew by 26 percent, despite two oil crises and intensified 
international  competition  (Verband  der  Automobilindustrie  [VDA]  1979, 
1989). Table 3.1  Plant Sample Characteristics 
United States  Germany 
Plant Qpe  Notation  Year Built  Product Type 
Employment 




Plant  US-A 
US-B 
us-c 
Transmission Plant  US-D 
US-E 
US-F 
Engine Plant  US-G 
US-H 
us-I 
1952  Compact 
1965  Full-size (luxury) 
1958  Midsize 
1952  4-speed automatic; FWD/RWD 
1965  4-speed automatic; FWD 
1955  3- and 4-speed automatic; 
FWDRWD 
195  1  V-6.4-cyIinder; gas 
1971  V-8,4.5 cylinder; gas 










G-A  1939  Subcompact 
G-B  1929  Compact and midsize 
G-C  193  1  Subcompact and compact 
G-D  1965  Subcompact and midsize 
G-E  1917  Subcompact (luxury) 
G-F  1986  Subcompact (luxury) 
G-G  1958  4- and 5-speed automatic, 
manual: FWDRWD 
G-H  1970  4-, 5-, and 6-cylinder; gas/diesel 










Note: FWD  = front wheel drive; RWD = rear wheel drive. 89  Strategic Adjustments in Training 
The plants surveyed are part of national industries that are enjoying different 
levels of  market  success. As mentioned  above, employment in the German 
automobile industry has grown throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, 
employment in the automobile industry suffered very little during the second 
oil crisis in 1979-80  and has grown almost steadily since that time, although 
the current recession in Germany has resulted in buy-offs of automobile work- 
ers. Employment in the U.S. automobile industry has been more affected by 
the oil shocks and business cycle, declining dramatically since the late 1970s. 
In addition, new car registrations in Germany increased by  25 percent from 
1970 to 1988 (VDA 1979, 1989).  In contrast, passenger car sales in the United 
States rose by only eight percent from 1970 to 1988 (Motor Vehicles Manufac- 
turers Association [MVMA] 1990). 
3.3.2  Employment Systems 
In terms of the employment systems of the plants in the two countries, sev- 
eral general comments can be made. I found great diversity in the extent of 
changes in employment systems across U.S. plants. Some plants have exten- 
sively broadened job content, reduced job classifications, and instituted team 
production,  while  other plants  have  made no substantive changes in these 
areas. Although collective bargaining agreements have outlined areas of partic- 
ipation between  local  unions  and plant  management,  a limited  number  of 
plants fully utilize these provisions. Although differences between employ- 
ment system adjustments exist across German plants, they were not as extreme 
as differences found across the U.S. plants. The type of payment system found 
in German plants generally allows for more flexibility among workers than the 
job classification system in the United  States. Working within an industrial 
relations system that legally provides significant job security and codetermina- 
tion rights for labor representatives on issues of job structure and training, most 
German works council leaders have been successful in encouraging manage- 
ment to broaden job content in an effort to obtain higher wages. The institu- 
tional structure of the German industrial relations system has also contributed 
to the extensive changes in the employment systems across plants. 
Table 3.2 compares the movement of plants in the United States and Ger- 
many  toward  more  flexible  employment systems. I  classify  the  degree of 
change in employment system flexibility in these plants into three categories: 
high, moderate, and low. I also allow for distinctions between “upper”  and 
“lower” levels within each of these three categories to indicate minor relative 
differences. I will later compare the degree of training in each of these plants 
with the degree of employment flexibility. These three categories-high,  mod- 
erate, and low-are  based on a qualitative assessment of changes in the plant’s 
employment system toward increasing the breadth of job content and/or job 
classifications, decentralizing various functions such as maintenance tasks and 
management and supervisory functions, expanding the use of team production, 90  Peter B. Berg 
Table 3.2  Plant Sample Classified by Degree of Change in Employment System 
Flexibility (plant type) 




























Note: See table 3.1 for explanation of notation 
and increasing the extent of labor participation into areas of work organization, 
job design, quality assessment, and training. For example, plants in the high- 
degree category would have made extensive changes to their employment sys- 
tems and perhaps have organized teams with broadly defined jobs and consid- 
erable participation of workers in various decisions. Plants in the low-degree 
category would have made few if  any changes in their employment systems, 
instead maintaining more traditional organizational forms characterized by a 
high division of  labor. Studies have shown that plants reforming human re- 
source practices away from rigid work rules and toward greater flexibility and 
participation are more productive and more likely to produce higher-quality 
products (McDuffie and Krafcik 1990;  McDuffie and Kochan 1991; Hartmann 
et al. 1983). 
The two U.S. engine plants are placed in the high-degree category because 
they have made the most extensive changes of  all the plants. These changes 
were the result of  management’s desire to experiment with radical organiza- 
tional reform and of the willingness of local unions to accommodate to these 
changes out of concern for job security. These two plants are the newest of 
the U.S. plants and are organized completely on a team basis. Each team is 
responsible for the full production of an engine component or for the assembly 
process. Furthermore, many of the formally centralized management decisions 
have been decentralized to the team level. The pay systems in these plants have 
been changed, and participation of workers has extended beyond simply issues 
of quality to include who receives training, who performs certain tasks, and 
who is involved in other production decisions. 91  Strategic Adjustments in Training 
The plants in the moderate-degree category have made significant changes 
in specijic areas to enhance organizational flexibility. This includes forming 
teams in  certain production areas, increasing the involvement of workers in 
decisions about training and job design, and broadening job content or creating 
new positions that require a variety of skills. These changes in U.S. plants were 
primarily  the result of management  initiative and of  pressure  put  on local 
unions to agree to them or face job losses. Plant US-A has made significant 
reductions in job classifications in its stamping area and has involved skilled 
and nonskilled  workers in decisions about job design for new areas of  the 
plant, while plant US-D has reduced job classifications and has created a large 
number of  machine monitors who operate as teams in their machining area. 
Plant US-B is on the lower end of this category because, despite reducing job 
classifications, it has  not broadened job content, introduced teams, or con- 
ducted effective worker participation. The German plants in the upper level of 
the moderate-degree category (see table 3.2) have made even more extensive 
strides in introducing teamwork in various areas, expanding the tasks of skilled 
workers, and reforming  rigid pay  practices.  Works council  participation  in 
these plants has been significant and is a motivating force for greater organiza- 
tional flexibility. Management in these plants has also been interested in mak- 
ing these organizational changes because they view them as a way to make 
more effective use of worker skills and to increase productivity. Plants G-B 
and G-C are in the process of making changes similar to those made in other 
German plants, but these changes have not yet been as vast. 
Plants in the low-degree category have not broadened job content, decentral- 
ized decision making, experimented with teamwork, nor enhanced worker par- 
ticipation, because of distrust and conflict between management and labor rep- 
resentatives, because of lack of direct economic pressure to change, or because 
of management strategies that emphasize managerial control over worker em- 
powerment. Plants US-C and US-E have not reduced job classifications or sig- 
nificantly modified work rules to allow for greater flexibility. Plant US-G is 
discussing changes in job classifications and team production, but at the time 
of  the interviews no changes had  occurred. Plant US-F has  informally  in- 
creased the tasks of certain jobs, but the local union has strongly resisted any 
adjustments that formally change the job structure or work rules. The two Ger- 
man plants in this category are the oldest and the newest in the German sample; 
in addition, they are part of the same company, which is primarily empowering 
front-line supervisors, rather than fully expanding the role of skilled workers 
at the point of production. Little experimentation has occurred in these plants, 
and the works councils have been very weak in their response to management’s 
traditional organizational initiatives. 
A general view of table 3.2 reveals that German plants are primarily clus- 
tered in the moderate category while U.S. plants are represented in all three 
categories, with most plants in the low category. This type of breakdown is 
consistent with the way the institutional environments in the two countries fa- 92  Peter B. Berg 
cilitate change. The rights of participation possessed by German works coun- 
cils and the legal rights of job security possessed by workers, combined with a 
cohesive union movement, allow for employment-system restructuring to take 
place under relatively secure institutional conditions. The German industrial 
relations system fosters corporatist-type participation at a variety of levels and 
an institutionally  supportive environment, in which both firms and workers 
have been more willing to adjust past practices toward higher overall levels of 
flexibility than are U.S. firms and workers. 
This type of institutional environment gives German plants an advantage 
over plants in the United States, where this type of institutional environment 
is lacking. Restructuring is difficult for many U.S. plants because of  a frag- 
mented industrial relations  environment. Local union members are often at 
odds with international union initiatives and therefore resist making changes 
or do not effectively use national negotiated avenues of  participation. Further- 
more, many  significant changes to the employment  systems of  automobile 
plants are the result of management initiatives tied to threats to close plants if 
specific  changes  are  not  adopted.  This  strategy  has  discouraged  effective 
worker participation in many plants. Although  some U.S. plants have made 
extensive changes to their employment systems, the lack of favorable institu- 
tional arrangements still causes problems. As Wolfgang Streeck states, “indi- 
vidual firms may . . . come to be diversified quality producers even in institu- 
tionally  impoverished  settings. However, . . . they  will  remain  islands (‘of 
excellence’) in a sea of more traditional production and lower production com- 
petence, and their performance will likely be less good and less stable than if 
they were part of a general pattern” (Streeck 1990, 13). 
In the next section, I examine the training practices of the various plants and 
the hours of training offered in different areas. I will then compare the extent 
to which training patterns in the individual plants support their employment 
systems. 
3.3.3  Training Practices 
As discussed in section 3.2, occupational training in Germany has a greater 
influence on plant-level training than does US.  occupational training. The data 
in table 3.3 indicate that, in general, German plants train significantly more 
apprentices as a percentage of total wage earners than do U.S. plants. 
Plants US-G and US-I are exceptions, having a slightly larger ratio of ap- 
prentices to wage earners than the two German engine plants. Plant US-I is a 
new plant that is gearing up for production, and plant US-G has an older work 
force with a large number of workers expected to retire. Plants US-H has no 
apprentices, because it draws on the large number of laid-off skilled workers 
in the company for its skilled needs. 
The emphasis of  U.S. apprenticeship training on plant-specific  skills is a 
weakness of  U.S. industrial skills training. In response, U.S. plant managers 
have sought to modify industrial apprenticeship training through cross-training 93  Strategic Adjustments in Training 
Table 3.3  Total Number of Apprentices in Industrial Occupations by Plant, 
1988-89 
United States  Germany 
Plant Qpe  Plant  Number of  Apprentices  Plant  Number of  Apprentices 
Automobile assembly  US-A 
US-B 
us-c 
Transmission  US-D 
US-E 
US-F 
Engine  US-G 
US-H 
us-I 
NA  G-A 
40 (0.7)  G-B 




57 (1.4)  G-G 
23 (0.6) 
53 (1.2) 
16 (2.6)  G-H 











Note:  NA = data not available; number of  apprentices as a percentage of  number of  wage earners 
in parentheses. 
measures. Cross-training broadens the job tasks of skilled workers by incorpo- 
rating the incidental work of other trades into workers’ own trades; more exten- 
sive cross-training can even create new, more broadly defined occupations. Al- 
though  management  in  all plants  expressed  a desire to  cross-train skilled 
workers in related trades, as a means of both increasing the flexibility of the 
skilled workers and reducing the size of the work force, little change has oc- 
curred in the content or structure of apprenticeship training. Unions resist such 
changes  to  apprenticeship training  because  of  the  negative  effects  these 
changes would have on employment and on the unions’ tradition of job control. 
Only one U.S. plant (US-B) is conducting extensive cross-training. It is es- 
sentially carrying out apprenticeship reform by creating new occupations that 
are broadly defined by  are not recognized outside that particular plant. The 
local union offered little resistance when management redefined the skilled 
occupations in the plant. The reforms are combining 13 trades into 7 trades, in 
which each skilled worker receives an average of 800-900  additional hours of 
training over seven years. The local union agreed to the changes to preserve 
jobs,  despite the fact that the cross-training is taking place without formal 
UAW  approval. The local union president at plant US-B said that he would 
prefer strong lines of demarcations between jobs and was reluctant to allow 
formal cross-training of skilled workers but noted that he felt the union had no 
choice but to agree to the changes in order to secure jobs. 
Given the absence of national or regional coordinating bodies or any action 
through collective bargaining, employers have responded by working through 
individual plants to get local unions to accept changes in apprenticeship train- 
ing in order to save jobs. These local initiatives, however, do not address the 94  Peter B. Berg 
overall inability of  the occupational training  system to support general skills 
training  at the plant level; moreover, they are likely  to lead to even greater 
quality differences between plants. 
In terms of plant-level further training, its composition across the two coun- 
tries reflects  the  role of  occupational  training within  the  firm and the bar- 
gaining between labor and management representatives over training issues. In 
general, U.S. plants have increased general training of workers in basic skills 
in many areas of the plant, through the nickel fund. German plants have worked 
through national corporatist bodies to make occupational training more flexi- 
ble; in addition, plant-level  further training in Germany focuses on specific 
groups of workers and builds on the broad, initial occupational skills acquired 
during the apprenticeship. 
Rather than simply comparing the aggregate number of  hours of training 
offered to workers in the various plants, I examine the hours offered of certain 
types of training and assess qualitative differences in training across the two 
countries. I have divided training programs into the following three categories 
to facilitate comparison. (1) Product and process awareness training: These are 
programs  designed to better inform the work force about the product or the 
process in which they work. (2)  Teamwork-plus training: These programs teach 
communication skills, problem solving skills such as statistical process con- 
trol,  math  skills, and team training.  (3)  Technical training:  These programs 
consist of specific courses primarily for skilled and certain nonskilled workers; 
they are conducted by equipment vendors or the plant training staff. Product 
and process awareness training is distinguished because of its widespread use 
and its emphasis on information rather than skill development. Teamwork-plus 
training focuses on the social and analytical skills demanded by new forms of 
work organization, and the technical training  category captures the effect of 
new technology and the demand for technical skills. 
Product and process awareness training. This awareness training is conducted 
on company time and is targeted at specific groups of workers. Table 3.4 shows 
the hours of  training offered in product and process awareness for U.S.  and 
German plants by job group.“ The purpose of these training programs is to 
show employees how the product, or at least their part of the final product, is 
put together and to show them the importance of their job in determining the 
quality of the final product. The word “training” is used loosely here; although 
certain knowledge is passed on to the employees through awareness training, 
the primary function of such a program is to communicate information rather 
than increase skills. 
Both transmission  plants and engine plants in the United States appear to 
4. The hours of  training offered by each plant is used to measure the composition of  training in 
each  plant.  These  hours  include  some of  the  actual  training  conducted  in  the  plants  during 
1988-89;  however, detailed breakdowns of how much training each job group actually received 
was unavailable. Table 3.4  Product and Process Awareness Tkaining: Hours of Training Offered on Paid Time 
to Nonskilled and Skilled Workers, 198849 
United States  Germany 
Training Offered  Training Offered 
Change in Employment 
System Flexilibity  Plant (type)  Nonskilled  Skilled  Plant (type)  Nonskilled  Skilled 
High-degree  US-I (engine)  56 
US-H (engine)  40 
Moderate-degree  US-A (assembly)  0 
US-D (transmission)  4 or 44 
US-B (assembly)  24 
Low-degree  US-F (transmission)  Offered 
US-G (engine)  10 
US-C (assembly)  Offere@ 



















2P  28" 
0  0 
40"  40" 
Offered  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
Offered  Offered 
Note: Offered = training offered but hours unknown; NA = data not available 
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engage in  awareness training to a greater extent than automobile assembly 
plants. Perhaps this is true because the transmission and engine plants are 
smaller and have fewer area divisions. Assembly plants, because of their large 
areas (assembly, trim, chassis, body, and paint), may feel it is better to orient 
workers to a new product by  area rather than by using a general program for 
the whole work force. Furthermore, plants US-A and US-C use quality deploy- 
ment sheets rather than a general program to orient workers to the new product. 
These sheets outline the operators’ job tasks and allow them to alter their tasks 
in ways that may improve quality and/or efficiency. 
The area of the plant where one works also has an effect on the hours of 
product awareness training one receives. In plant US-D, assembly workers re- 
ceived only 4 hours of training, while workers in the machining area received 
44 hours of training. This reflects differences in the jobs in the two areas but 
also shows the emphasis plant management places on certain types of training. 
Whereas plant US-E offers a significant amount of product awareness training 
to all job groups, plant US-D emphasizes other areas of training, such as group 
interaction skills and technical skills. Local unions view product and process 
awareness as positive. It was the intent of the nickel fund to encourage such 
training, and most local unions would like to see more of this training con- 
ducted. 
In German plants, integrating skilled workers into production areas brings 
not only highly  qualified workers into the production department but  also 
workers who, through their initial apprenticeship training, have an understand- 
ing of product quality and knowledge of the overall production scheme. Thus, 
there is a feeling that such product and process awareness courses are not nec- 
essary, which would presumably reduce labor costs for German plants. This 
training has appeared in German plants, however, because of  the initiatives of 
works councils linking this type of training to a major change in the organiza- 
tion of work. As table 3.4 indicates, German plants offer less product and pro- 
cess awareness training to both nonskilled and skilled workers than do U.S. 
Furthermore, awareness training programs in  German plants are specific 
programs designed for a select group of workers in a newly organized area of 
production, rather than broad programs designed to inform or instill a work 
ethic in the work force. Plant G-A, for example, is offering process awareness 
training in a small group of workers in plastic bumper production, which is 
organized in work groups. In plant G-H, a proposal to institute group work in 
the engine-casing production area included an engine, technology, and quality 
awareness course for nonskilled workers. Efforts are also being made to ex- 
pand this to the assembly area. In plant G-G, only those workers trained as 
system operators receive product and process training. Although system opera- 
tors are generally skilled workers, plant G-G further trains a large number of 
nonskilled workers into this position. This is done because the plant has reor- 
ganized rapidly and it needs more system operators than it has skilled workers. 
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In addition, the plant has an agreement with the IG Metal1 to further train 
nonskilled workers. 
Teamwork-plus training. The hours of teamwork-plus training offered at the 
U.S. and German plants surveyed are presented in table 3.5. The primary func- 
tion of  this type of  training is to enhance the communication between job 
groups in the plant by providing common methods to.describe and solve prob- 
lems, although this training is also used to enhance the effectiveness of quality 
circles or teams. Statistical process control (SPC) and math skills, as well as 
step-by-step problem-solving procedures, are  the  most  commonly offered 
forms of this training. 
The data in table 3.5 indicates that, in the United States, transmission and 
engine plants offer more of  this type of  training than automobile assembly 
plants. Large assembly operations usually train a select group of workers to be 
SPC coordinators. While operators may receive general SPC awareness train- 
ing, only coordinators receive extensive training and conduct periodic inspec- 
tions of parts. Transmission and engine plants tend to give all operators more 
extensive SPC training, especially plants US-D, US-H, and US-I. 
Plant US-C has pursued a different strategy with regard to teamwork-plus 
training. The formal employee involvement program was eliminated at this 
plant because of union resistance and because of misuse by some supervisors, 
who used information gathered from employees to eliminate their jobs. As a 
result, no formal teamwork-plus training is conducted for the hourly  work 
force. The plant management has instead invested significant resources and 
time in training front-line supervisors in these skills. These supervisors are 
trying to impart these skills informally to their particular work areas. It is too 
early to tell how effective this strategy will be. 
Among the U.S. transmission plants, US-D offers the most extensive train- 
ing to all nonskilled operators. Of  the 116 hours of training offered, 76 hours 
of training are in SPC, math skills, and problem-solving skills; the remaining 
40  hours of training consist of a voluntary team training program with skilled 
and supervisory personnel. This stands in contrast to plant US-F, where group 
interaction training is offered but only to operators in the new product area. 
Engine plants US-H and US-I, which are run on a teamwork basis, conduct 
significant training in group interaction for all employees. This type of training 
is used as the foundation of the teamwork approach, which relies on communi- 
cation between job groups and on group problem solving. In  the assembly 
plants, little teamwork-plus training is offered, indicating that the job require- 
ments of assembly workers have not changed enough to justify broad training 
beyond communication skills and greater product awareness. 
Management strategy also contributes to the amount of teamwork-plus train- 
ing a worker receives. Plant US-D, for example, provides significant training 
of this type to all nonskilled operators because management believes that oper- 
ators should be trained in skills beyond the needs of their current jobs. Further- Table 3.5  Teamwork-Plus  Training: Hours of Training Offered on Paid Time to Nonskilled 
and Skilled Workers, 1988-89 
Germany  United States 
Change in  Training Offered  Training Offered 
Employment 
System Flexilibity  Plant (type)  Nonskilled  Skilled  Plant (type)  Nonskilled  Skilled 
High degree  US-I (engine) 
US-H (engine) 
Moderate degree  US-A (assembly) 
US-D (transmission) 
US-B (assembly) 

















































Nore: Offered = training offered but hours unknown; NA = data not available 
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more, some plants (US-D, US-E, and US-G) offer less group interaction train- 
ing to skilled workers than to nonskilled workers or simply offer the skilled 
workers no training of this type. Shlled workers in these plants are perceived 
to  already  possess  the  appropriate knowledge  to communicate with  other 
groups in the plant, and thus this training is considered redundant. Other plants 
(US-B, US-H, and US-I) offer the same amount of training to nonskilled and 
skilled workers. This uniformity reflects a management strategy which seeks 
to give all job groups an equal understanding of effective communication and 
problem-solving strategies. This also reflects union efforts to ensure access to 
general training for all workers. 
The specific teamwork-plus training programs in German plants consist of 
problem-solving training (or diagnostic training), SPC training, quality train- 
ing, and communication training. As in the United States, the integration of 
inspection into the production  area has brought about training  for a select 
group of workers in areas where these skills are most needed. In general, Ger- 
man plants concentrate on diagnostic and SPC training and, to a lesser degree, 
on communication and product quality training. The diagnostic and SPC train- 
ing is geared toward skilled workers or nonskilled workers in high-skill posi- 
tions, such as the system operator. The training is more sophisticated than the 
broad problem solving or basic SPC that U.S. plants provide. German plants 
target this type of training toward highly skilled workers in automated areas, 
rather  than  providing  general training to  a large portion  of  the  nonskilled 
work force. 
Group-building and communication training are underdeveloped in German 
plants. Only plant G-D offers formal group-building training to its skilled and 
nonskilled workers in its automated body-welding areas. These workers con- 
sist mostly of skilled workers or system operators. Both plants G-E and G-F 
offer no teamwork-plus training to their workers; the plants are organized in a 
traditional manner and only recently has quality control been integrated into 
their production areas. Training in communication skills and team training is 
given to supervisory personnel. 
To  summarize, product and process awareness training and teamwork-plus 
training in U.S. plants represent general training programs supported by  the 
nickel fund and its administrative structure. This training is designed to give a 
large number of workers basic general skills and to improve their attention to 
quality. In German plants, product awareness training is designed for specific 
groups of workers who are in areas of the plant undergoing reorganization. 
Teamwork-plus training is designed for workers in highly skilled jobs and is 
intended to  increase their ability to diagnose and solve complex problems. 
While German plants continue to focus on technical or diagnostic training for 
high-skill jobs, works councils have been advocating greater use of teamwork- 
plus and product awareness training, in conjunction with their proposals for 
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Technical training. The number of hours of technical training offered at U.S. 
and German plants sorted by job group are presented in table 3.6.5  Technical 
training includes courses on plant equipment and equipment programming, 
troubleshooting, robotics, computer training, and vendor training on specific 
equipment. This is very specific training centered on a piece of equipment or 
a process. 
In U.S. plants, the amount of technical training offered to nonskilled work- 
ers is influenced primarily by management strategy. New forms of work organ- 
ization, such as teamwork, and the creation of  more demanding jobs in the 
nonskilled  area, as well as the broadening  of job tasks, have increased the 
amount of technical training for certain nonskilled workers. In the two plants 
organized by teams (US-H and US-I), nonskilled workers receive some of the 
highest amounts of training across the plants. The 120 hours of technical train- 
ing in plant US-H is provided to operators in the machining area, while plant 
US-I offers 281 hours to all nonskilled workers. In plant US-D, 188 hours of 
the 208 hours provided to nonskilled workers is directed toward manufacturing 
technicians. The remaining 20 hours is geared toward operators who work with 
robots  in  the machining  area. The remaining  plants provide training to job 
setters or, in the case of plant US-G, to operators on the transfer line of the 
latest product. The complexity of new equipment has demanded that operators 
in these areas also receive training. Notably absent from the technical training 
roster are operators in the assembly area. These jobs remain very manual and 
have not been reorganized to require extensive technical training. 
As  seen in table 3.6, U.S. skilled workers receive more technical training 
than nonskilled workers, but within the skilled ranks some trades receive more 
training than others. Electricians tend to receive the most training of  all the 
industrial trades. In plant US-A, for example, 51.3 percent of all the hours 
of  technical training offered to the skilled trades is for electricians. In plant 
US-E, this figure is 42 percent. 
The variance between U.S. plants in the training offered to skilled workers 
reflects the extent to which ongoing technical training has been developed at 
the plant level. Some plants have created extensive courses utilizing their train- 
ing staff and equipment vendors, while other plants are less organized or have 
concentrated training mainly around the launch of new products. 
In  Germany, skilled workers are also the primary  recipients  of  technical 
training. Although some technical training is offered to nonskilled workers, it 
is offered only to a very small percentage of this work force. Typically those 
nonskilled workers in areas of the plant undergoing organizational change or 
5. The hours of  training offered were calculated by  adding up the total number of  technical 
training hours per course at the time of  the interviews (in 1989). Only the training hours at plant 
US-B are based on  the year  1988. The hours of  training offered will be affected by  the plant’s 
position in  its product cycle and the introduction of  new technology. Plants US-A, US-G, and 
US-I were launching new products at the time of the interviews, and much of their training reflects 
the need to  educate workers in the new technology. Table 3.6  Technical Training: Hours of Training otrered on Paid Time to Nonskilled and 
Skilled Workers, 1988-89 
United States  Germany 
Change in  Training Offered  Training Offered 
Employment System 
Flexilibity  Plant (type)  Nonskilled  Skilled  Plant (type)  Nonskilled  Skilled 
High degree  US-I (engine) 
US-H (engine) 
Moderate degree  US-A (assembly) 
US-D (transmission) 
US-B (assembly) 















848  G-A (assembly)  77-618" 
326b  G-D (assembly)  268" 
1,325'  G-G (transmission)  416" 
G-H (engine)  568 
G-I (engine)  0 
G-B (assembly)  128 
Offered  G-E (assembly)  0 
5Ogb  G-F (assembly)  0 












Note: Offered = training offered but hours unknown; NA = data not available. 
Training offered to a select group only. 
bEstimate  based on available data. 
'Of  the 1,325 hours, 1,245 represents the average amount of cross-training conducted for all skilled trades in 1989. 102  Peter B. Berg 
areas receiving new technology will be given some amount of technical train- 
ing. German nonskilled workers receive significantly more training of this type 
than U.S. nonskilled workers. The works councils in German plants play a key 
role in ensuring that some nonskilled workers have access to technical training. 
Management clearly would like to further train only skilled workers; however, 
works councils in most plants are able to codetermine which workers receive 
training and thus ensure the inclusion of  some nonskilled  workers in further 
technical training. 
While there do not appear to be great differences between the United States 
and Germany in hours of skilled technical training, the technical training Ger- 
man skilled workers receive is more sophisticated and ongoing rather than con- 
centrated around the launch of new products. This reflects the extensive initial- 
skills training they receive during their apprenticeship and the fact that skilled 
workers in Germany are expected to utilize their understanding of the theoreti- 
cal foundations of the production equipment and the overall process of produc- 
tion. U.S. skilled  workers,  on the contrary, are given very specific jobs and 
receive  narrow  theoretical  training.  In many  cases,  skilled  workers  at U.S. 
plants are ill-equipped to  repair complicated, computerized equipment. Pro- 
duction managers in several plants reported that engineers had to spend “too 
much time”  training  skilled workers  to repair the equipment.  Furthermore, 
some plants simply require equipment  vendors  to repair equipment up to a 
year or more after installation. This reflects quality deficiencies in the appren- 
ticeship training and narrow use of U.S. skilled workers. 
3.4  Linking Training Practices with Employment Systems 
3.4.1  Comparisons within Countries 
A reexamination of  tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 indicates that greater hours of 
training are associated with movement toward more flexible employment sys- 
tems. Plants US-H and US-I, in the high-degree category, support their em- 
ployment systems with relatively long hours of training, especially product and 
process awareness training and teamwork-plus training. The hours of technical 
training  are less clear; although the amount of  technical training  offered to 
skilled workers is not among the highest of U.S. plants, the amount of training 
offered to nonskilled workers is relatively high. This involvement of tradition- 
ally nonskilled workers in the training  process is indicative of more flexible 
human resource structures and employment systems. 
U.S. plants in the moderate-degree category also reveal an association be- 
tween training hours offered and greater flexibility in the employment system. 
Plant US-D offers relatively long hours of product and process awareness train- 
ing, as well as of teamwork-plus training. While technical training offered to 
skilled workers is comparatively low, selected nonskilled workers are receiving 
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training offered by plant US-B reflects the amount of cross-training being con- 
ducted,  while  the  hours  of  product  and  process  awareness  training  and 
teamwork-plus training are more moderate. Plant US-A does not fit the pattern 
of the other two U.S. plants in this category. The hours of product and process 
awareness training and teamwork-plus training is very low. You may recall that 
this plant dealt with process awareness on an individual basis, through quality 
deployment sheets. In terms of technical training, skilled workers are offered 
a relatively high number of hours, while certain nonskilled workers receive a 
moderate number. Although plant US-A was establishing, at the time of the 
interviews, a new stamping facility organized around a few broad job classifi- 
cations and involving labor representatives  in work organization  decisions, 
their training efforts are focused primarily on technical skills rather than social 
and analytical skills. 
Among  the  German  plants,  those  in  the moderate-degree  category  offer 
most of  the product  and process  awareness training,  all the teamwork-plus 
training, and by far the most hours of technical training, both to skilled and 
nonskilled workers. Plants G-E and G-F, in the low-degree category, offer vir- 
tually no product and process awareness training or teamwork-plus training; 
furthermore, the technical training offered by these plants goes exclusively to 
skilled workers. 
Finally, among all the U.S. plants, those in the low-degree category tend to 
offer the least amount of training in all three areas. The one clear exception to 
this  is plant  US-E. Relative to other U.S. plants,  US-E  offers a  very  high 
amount of product and process awareness training and a moderate amount of 
teamwork-plus training. Given the very traditional nature of its employment 
system, the number of hours offered by plant US-E seem unusually high. They 
represent, however, a well-organized  training department that is using these 
types of training as a means to change the ideology of the work force, making 
them more quality conscious and aware of the importance of their job to the 
whole production process. The traditional nature of the employment system in 
plant US-E is better seen in the hours of  technical training offered. A high 
number of hours are offered to skilled workers, but nonskilled  workers are 
offered comparatively few hours of training. 
3.4.2  Comparisons across Countries 
While more hours of training are associated with movement toward more 
flexible employment systems in both U.S. and German plants, hours of training 
alone do not fully explain the ability of firms to achieve a high overall level of 
employment system flexibility. Comparative analysis reveals that the occupa- 
tional training system and the industrial relations institutions have important 
roles to play in this process. In Germany, these institutions create an environ- 
ment that encourages greater organizational flexibility.  The German enterprise- 
based occupational training system provides broad, general skills training that 
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apprenticeship system. The “skill capacity” generated by the German occupa- 
tional training system, combined with the use of  skilled workers throughout 
the production process, is at the heart of the flexibility of German plants. The 
occupational training system also accounts for differences in training strategies 
across countries. Given the skills generated by the occupational training sys- 
tem, German managers perceive less of a need for product and process aware- 
ness training and some forms of teamwork-plus training. In addition, the Ger- 
man industrial relations system, with strong industrial unions and workplace 
codetermination,  has been an instrumental force in encouraging work reorgani- 
zation and training. Works councils have been particularly successful in includ- 
ing more hours of training in initiatives to expand organizational flexibility. 
This supportive institutional environment is lacking in the United States. 
The focus of  the industrial apprenticeship training system on firm-specific 
skills does not  generate a broadly trained work force. The job content for 
skilled workers remains primarily unchanged. Efforts have been focused on 
increasing the  tasks  of  nonskilled workers, but  these workers  are neither 
trained to nor allowed to perform complicated maintenance tasks and thus have 
limited flexibility. Collective bargaining has provided joint training funds for 
basic skill training and established a structure for labor and management par- 
ticipation on training issues, but the use of these funds and the success of par- 
ticipation has been mixed across the U.S.  plants. The industrial relations insti- 
tutions have not been effective in encouraging widespread movement toward 
greater employment system flexibility. The use of  threats by  management to 
obtain concessions from local unions has not helped the process of participa- 
tion. In addition, the general lack of initiative by local unions to put forth their 
own proposals regarding work reorganization has discouraged more extensive 
flexibility in U.S. plants. 
3.5  Conclusion 
Although automobile firms can pursue a variety of strategies in response to 
intensifying international competition, employment system flexibility remains 
a fundamental component of diversified quality production. Automobile com- 
panies in the United States and Germany are in fact pursuing more flexible 
employment systems in response to competitive pressure, but the extent of 
changes in  the organization of  work and the requirements of  workers differ 
between the two countries. In  Germany, auto plants have  concentrated on 
broadening the job content of their skilled workers by combining maintenance 
and production tasks and by  increasing the importance of machine monitoring, 
troubleshooting, and programming tasks. In U.S. plants, formal demarcations 
between maintenance and production work remain. 
Training practices in both countries have responded to new forms of organi- 
zation, new technology, and new job requirements, albeit in different ways and 
to different degrees. While greater hours of training are associated with more 105  Strategic Adjustments in Training 
flexible employment systems, the most striking contrast between the two coun- 
tries is the qualitative differences in the training offered to workers. German 
plants offer more sophisticated training to their skilled workers, and German 
teamwork-plus training tends to be more complex than that offered to U.S. 
workers.  Furthermore, the German occupational training system generates a 
broadly trained work force able to take on responsibility and perform a variety 
of  tasks.  Rather than limiting the flexibility  of  firms, national occupational 
training standards establish a common ground of skills that firms build on with 
their own further training. 
U.S.  automobile plants have increased the amount of  basic general skills 
training through the allocation of joint training funds. However, it is unlikely 
that these training measures will be able to create the skill capacity and envi- 
ronment necessary  to foster more flexible employment systems. An occupa- 
tional training system that continues to promote firm-specific  skills and di- 
vided industrial relations institutions make restructuring employment systems 
much more difficult for U.S. plants. Where restructuring does take place, train- 
ing must be an essential element. However, simply increasing the hours of 
training is not necessarily enough. As the German cases have shown, institu- 
tions, such as the occupational training system and the industrial relations sys- 
tem, play important roles in creating an environment that facilitates organiza- 
tional flexibility. Competitive success for the U.S.  auto industry, and stable 
employment for its workers,  will not come simply from a reorganization of 
jobs, nonrestrictive work rules, or additional hours of training. Rather success 
and stability require a fundamental restructuring of training institutions in such 
a way as to provide a secure environment that encourages ongoing broad, gen- 
eral skills training and supports flexible employment systems. 
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